ABSTRACT: This paper aims at assessing the impact on citizens' well-being of fiscal discipline imposed by Central Government to sub-national governments. Since health care policies involve strategic interactions between different layers of governments in many different countries, we focus on a particular dimension of well-being, namely citizens' health. We model fiscal discipline by considering sub-national governments expectations of future deficit bailouts from the Central Government. We then study how these bailout expectations affect the expenditure for health care policies carried out by decentralized governments. To investigate this issue, we separate efficient health spending from inefficiencies by estimating an input requirement frontier. This allow us to assess the effects of bailout expectations on both the structural component of health expenditure and its deviations from the 'best practice'. The evidence from the 15 Italian Ordinary Statute Regions (observed from 1993 to 2006) points out that bailout expectations do not significantly influence the position of the frontier, thus do not affect citizens' health. However, they appear to exert a remarkable impact on excess spending. JEL Codes: H11, H75, H77, I12, I18
Introduction
An important policy issue in decentralised settings is what the Central Government (CG) should do when lower level governments realise a deficit. In many instances, the CG bails out regional debts. Evidence on this point -sometimes referred to improperly as a sign of the softness of local budget constraints -is widespread.
However, to avoid future deficits, a standard policy suggestion in this case is to adopt effective measures to harden the budget constraint of local governments. This is thought to increase accountability of local politicians, hence to increase social welfare by reducing future wastes. Hardening the budget constraint, however, is not always thought to be a good idea. For instance, Besfamille and Lockwood (2008) suggest that an hard budget constraint can induce local governments to avoid socially desirable investments. This reflects an usual claim by local governments: in their view, the occurrence of a deficit is the consequence of an inadequate amount of resources needed to finance the provision of public services, and not evidence of wastes. Restraining the budget constraint, will then imply a lower provision of public services, hence a lower level of social welfare.
The importance of this argument can be best understood when thinking to specific policies involving interactions between Central and local governments. One of these policies is surely health care. Assignment of health policy involve some actions by local governments almost everywhere (e.g., Saltman et al., 2007) . In Federal countries (e.g., Canada, Australia) health policy is an exclusive responsibility of Regional Governments (RGs), although largely financed by federal government. In Regional countries (e.g., Italy, Spain) health policy is a joint responsibility of CG and RGs. In unitary countries (e.g., Nordic countries) there is a large role played by local governments in health policy. In all these cases, health expenditure stems from the interaction between different levels of government; and modern fiscal federalism theory suggests -in these cases -the likely presence of Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) problems: if CG cannot commit not to bail out overexpenditure at the local level, SBC problems might arise, and RGs have incentives to inflate health expenditure, as they expect the residents of other jurisdictions to foot the bill (e.g., Kornai et al., 2003) . Indeed, the presence of massive bailouts in the case of health care policy is recognised by a large literature (see, e.g., Kornai, 2009 ).
There is also evidence -at least for Italy -that bailout expectations matter in inducing fiscal discipline. As Bordignon and Turati (2009) show, CG can influence regional health expenditure behaviour by adjusting health care funding, and RGs react by adjusting spending: RGs expectations of a tighter CG in terms of funding imply then a tighter control on health expenditure. But what is the effect of this effort by CG to harden the budget constraint of local governments? If the story about a welfare improvement in hardening the budget constraint is right, then -by imposing a tighter control on expenditure -CG is eliminating only inefficiencies, and this should produce any real effects in terms of services produced for citizens. If the story is incorrect, then hardening the budget constraint will imply a reduction of services produced and a deterioration of social welfare.
The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to this open question: does fiscal discipline affect structural (efficient) expenditure or simply inefficiency? In other words, does fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments has any real effects on citizens' well-being, by influencing their health, e.g., via a reduction of the quantity or the quality of relevant health care services? Or it simply reduces the waste of public resources, e.g., by rationalizing the existing hospital network 1 or improving service appropriateness? We assess inefficiency in public spending to produce citizens' health, using several proxies for health status of regional populations in Italy, namely the average life expectancy at different ages and the infant mortality rate. We build on Bordignon and Turati (2009, BT09 from now on) to identify bailout expectations, and then test if only health expenditure inefficiencies, or also structural expenditure, are affected by fiscal discipline. In the former case, expectations affect waste; in the latter case, expectations affect citizens' health. We find evidence supporting the idea that perceived fiscal discipline affects only inefficiency, and does not have any real effects on citizens' well-being.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the intergovernmental relationships in the Italian National Health Service (NHS).
Section 3 sketches a theoretical framework to guide the following empirical analysis, by borrowing results from the model developed by BT09. Section 4 describes the data, the empirical strategy and the results. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
Institutional framework: the Italian NHS
The Italian NHS -introduced by the Law 833 in 1978 -is a public universalistic The increase in spending has been paired with an improvement in the population health, one of the basic component of citizens' well-being (e.g., Deaton, 2008). The average life expectancy at birth (ALE) and the infant mortality rate (IMR) are the proxy measures for public health commonly adopted in the literature (e.g., Turnock, 2007 mandatory standards for health services); 2) the responsibility for framework legislation; 3) the ultimate responsibility for health care financing. Since its foundation in 1978, the funding of the Italian NHS followed (and still follows, at least to some extent) a sort of 3-stage process 4 . The first step is the ordinary funding:
the CG define in December, with the Budget Law for the following year, the 'topping up' on Regional revenues (a blend of earmarked taxes and tariffs). The second step is the redistribution among the Regions of these resources according to an 'appropriation formula', that involves also some bargaining between CG and RGs. Finally, the third step may be called extra-ordinary funding: the CG discretionally bails out RGs deficits, by deciding how much of the deficit cover and when to intervene. Since RGs are uncertain on CG intervention when they take their decision on spending, expectations of future deficit bailouts influence present expenditure decisions, either affecting only inefficiencies or hitting also structural expenditure.
Indeed, according to Constitution, RGs are in charge of the expenditure task in the Italian NHS. In particular, they are entitled of: 1) the organisation and the provision of health services (e.g., the management of hospitals and Local Health Units); 2) the provision of additional services with respect to the mandatory national standards (LEA). As there are 15 Ordinary Statute Regions (plus 5 Special Statute Regions), even in the presence of these national mandatory standards, it is not surprising that there are territorial differences among RGs along several dimensions:
per-capita spending, the organisation of health services provision (and associated inefficiencies), population health. Evidence on inefficiencies in the provision of health care services (which sometimes degenerate in genuine cases of corruption) are widespread in all RGs. If we take citizens' satisfaction for medical assistance in hospitals as an indirect proof of inefficiencies, we obtain the situation depicted in 
Source: ISTAT -Health for All
How expectations of future bailout can impact on this situation? As we will discuss in more details below, the recent Italian history suggests that CG has done its best to influence bailout expectations in the direction of hardening the budget constraint; and this action was effective during the '90s (BT09). What we study in this paper is whether hardening the budget constraint has had any real effects on citizens' welfare, by worsening the provision of health care services, or it simply cut down the inefficiencies in health care services provision by RGs. To do so, we need both to 'measure' expectations in some ways, and to separate efficient from inefficient spending. We approach these two problems in turn.
Identifying bailout expectations

The 'intergovernmental game'
In order to 'measure' expectations, in this section we briefly sketch a theoretical framework useful for the following empirical analysis. We borrow from BT09, that provide some fundamental predictions for our test on the effects of bailout expectations on citizens' well-being. The authors consider a dynamic game with incomplete information; there are two players (here levels of government), a CG and a RG. The timing of the game strictly mirrors the relationships in the Italian NHS:
at the first stage, CG finances RG, by choosing between two levels of funding (F), In other words, when the probability p to face a 'tough' CG is high, a low level of exante funding is perceived as a more reliable signal that CG is indeed 'tough'; therefore, RG reacts by choosing a low level of spending. Jointly considered, these two theoretical predictions suggest to investigate the effects of bailout expectations 5 We refer interested readers to the original paper for the formal proof of this result.
on RGs spending performance by testing the impact of 'expected' funding, i.e., exante CG funding conditional to RGs expectations on p. The crucial empirical problem -to be discussed next -is how to find proper proxies for changes in p.
From the theory to the data
Changes in p mean a shift in bailout expectations, due to a strengthening of CG's commitment technology: when it is more costly for CG itself to run deficits (due for instance to external constraints) and when there are new tools for RGs to respect their budget (for instance, because of larger tax bases, or an electoral system that increase the accountability of local politicians), then the probability to face a 'tough' CG increases. The problem is how to model this shift.
We follow here BT09 and exploit a 'quasi-natural experiment' in Italy. In particular, the link between theoretical model and observable variables is based on the consideration of key events in the Italian economic history starting from the '90s, and their potential impact on p. The list includes the following events:
• 1992: a severe financial crisis, determined by an unsustainable level of both public deficit and public debt, which lead the country close to default and opened the door to a season of reforms;
• 1993: a structural reform of the NHS, which introduced more autonomy for Local
Health Units in charge of providing services to citizens, and separated the third party payer from hospitals (the providers of services), to create a quasi-market competition similar to the one experienced in the English NHS;
• 1994: a reform of the National voting system, with the aim of strengthening CG and its ability to implement reform and manage the public budget (notice that duration of government during the '80s was less than one year);
• 1995: a reform of the Regional voting system, with the aim of increasing the accountability of Regional Governors in charge of managing resources for health care (notice that approximately 80% on average of regional expenditures are for health care services);
at the end of 1993 -to examine EU countries in order to define the first group of participants to the European monetary union (EMU) and the adoption of the Euro.
The test was mainly based on two parameters of public finances sustainability, specifically the debt-to-GDP ratio < 60% and the deficit-to-GDP ratio < 3%;
• 1997: the introduction of a new regional tax (IRAP), aimed at reducing vertical imbalance, and at increasing regional accountability;
• 1998: the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty (better known as the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP from now on), which define conditions for remaining in the EMU.
In particular, a close-to-zero deficit was required in the medium run; in any case, public deficit-to-GDP ratio cannot be more than 3%. 6 Starting from the above list of key events, we define a set of proxies for changes in p, i.e. the probability to observe a 'tough' CG, defining a list of variables € per capita by using a CPI index. 8
As for the empirical strategy, we consider the 'substitution method'
suggested by BT09. The main objectives of the paper are: to test theoretical claim (b) that, after having observed a low level of ex-ante CG funding, RGs should be more likely to react with a low spending level the higher is p; and, more importantly, to verify whether changes in p (i.e., in bailout expectations) impact the efficient component and/or the waste component of overall spending. Since CG funding is not exogenously given, but -according to the theoretical framework sketched abovedepends itself on the commitment technology available for CG, we need to go along the following steps:
• we first check the effects of changes in p on ex-ante CG funding (FUND ST ), by estimating a model of funding which includes the proxies for bailout expectations discussed above among the regressors;
• we then get 'expected' funding (i.e., predicted ex-ante CG funding given changes in p) from first step estimates and insert this variable (EXPFUND ST ) in a proper health production function/frontier;
• we finally check whether EXPFUND ST affects structural expenditure (hence, citizens' health) and/or inefficiency (hence, excess spending given a certain health output).
Modelling ex-ante central government funding
We define -differently from BT09 -the variable FUND ST as the difference between total funding and regional funding. This is a measure of the ex-ante CG transfers per capita to each Region, i.e. the topping up on regional own resources which constitutes the first step in regional health care funding. 9 All proxies for changes in bailout expectations -but D GOV 10 -are strongly statistically significant and show a sign consistent with our a priori and previous findings by BT09. An increase in the tax base given to regions should increase their ability to cope autonomously with their deficits, and this should make more credible the threat by CG not to bail them out (hence, the coefficient of TAXBASE < 0). As Maastricht requirements become more binding, CG should be perceived as tougher (hence, the coefficient of D MAAS < 0), and this effect should be more important the higher the Italian deficit with respect to the EU average (hence, the coefficient of PBT < 0), and the closer the deadline for the admission test to be included in the first group of countries adopting the Euro (hence, the coefficient of Overall, as it is suggested by theoretical prediction (a), we effectively observe a lower level of ex-ante CG funding when p is high than when p is low. This is true also on a different and longer time span with respect to the one considered by BT09, that was limited to the '90s only. Table 3 11 Notice that the possibility that some member states might in the future obtain back their monetary sovereignty is not even considered in European Treaties. As argued by Bordignon and Brusco (2001) , the absence of explicit provisions can be seen as a commitment device to increase stability. However, the increased stability can probably lower the expectations that penalties and automatic sanctions will be effectively applied in the case of fiscal crisis; and -in turn -soften the countries budget constraints. The example of Greece seems to provide evidence for this effect to be effectively at work. the previous years, when more severe fiscal rules for accessing EMU were in force (see Figure 4 below).
Modelling regional government spending
Model specification and estimation method
A crucial issue to understand whether bailout expectations affected structural health expenditure, or just impacted on inefficiencies and wastes, is the identification of the efficient and inefficient components of RGs spending for health care policies. To this aim, we assume that health care outcomes result from a standard microeconomic 'production function', where population health is the output, spending and other health-related variables are the inputs, and a process of optimization underlies the observed data. 12 The bulk of previous studies assessing health systems' performance assume maximization of health given a certain amount of expenditure as the objective to be pursued by the policy maker. However, considering the Italian context described above, the rapid growth in public health spending for all European countries in the last decades, the significantly higher health status compared to less developed contexts, and the role played by public finance constraints imposed by European rules, we assume here that the goal of RGs consists in minimizing the cost of providing a certain level of health output, given other inputs and a set of control variables. This issue can be addressed by modelling RGs spending behavior as an input requirement function. This concept was first introduced by Diewert (1974), and later extended by Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995) to incorporate inefficiency in the production process, i.e., the use of excess input compared to the optimal (minimum) need defined by a 'best-practice' frontier. 13 The identification of a proper outcome for quantifying the impact of health care policies on well-being is a rather difficult issue, because the effectiveness of health services can be assessed by considering a variety of aspects (e.g., length and quality of life, equity in accessing the services, etc). According to most of the past studies on health systems' efficiency and the literature on public health, we adopt two traditional measures of population health and proxy the output (Y) both as average life expectancy at birth (ALE) and infant mortality rate (IMR). We also experimented with average life expectancy at different ages, namely at 45 (ALE 45 ) and at 75 (ALE 75 ), to capture the impact of public care on avoidable mortality due to illnesses typically affecting health around these lifetimes (e.g., cardiovascular diseases or cancers). 14 As for the basic inputs of health production process, per capita public and In addition, we augment our specification with a set of control variables (CV ) that are likely to generate possible shifts in the production relationship, both over time and across Regions. 16 Specifically, we include: a time trend variable (TREND) to take into account possible improvements in health care delivery over years due to 14 Life expectancy is the average number of years of life remaining at a given age and, in the database Health for All, it is computed separately for men and women. Therefore, male and female life expectancies have been averaged by male and female populations, in order to obtain a single index. Infant mortality rate is given by the number of children who die during the first year of life per 10,000 newborns. Some recent studies (e. Kumbhakar, 2010) have measured health outcomes in terms of Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE), an indicator of healthy life expectancy which differs from 'pure' life expectancy or mortality indices in that it considers the quality of life besides its length. However, information on DALE disaggregated at regional level is just available for a couple of years. 15 This variable is computed as the share of persons with a university degree out of the total regional population. We thank Anna Laura Mancini for kindly providing these data. 16 Or (2000), Gravelle et al. (2003) and Greene (2004) argued about the importance to enrich the basic input-output relationship of the health production process, by adding further covariates able to account for some of the widespread heterogeneity that is usually present in this type of data. technical change; two demographic indicators, i.e., the share of males (MALE) and of people older than 75 (OLD75), which are expected to exert a negative and positive impact, respectively, on the minimum level of H PUB required to attain a given level of Y, ceteris paribus 17 ; a variable accounting for the effect of bailout expectations, i.e., EXPFUND ST obtained from estimates of Eq. [1] (the way we test whether this factor is a shifter of the frontier or affects the inefficiency is discussed later); finally, given the wide variation in cultural and economic characteristics of our sample (especially between Northern and Southern Regions), which is likely to influence health policy outcomes, we incorporate individual fixed-effects (REG) in the estimated model, so as to control for unobserved heterogeneity across Regions. Table   4 shows summary statistics for all the variables included in the input requirement function; to support the choice of using panel data methods, one can notice that both the dependent variable and the regressors show enough variation in the data, 17 The importance of technological change and demographic factors such as age and gender is widely debated in the empirical literature on health spending determinants. Chernichovsky and Markowitz (2004) provide a survey of the main findings of these studies and an interesting analysis of the Israeli experience. 18 In particular, within variation is dominant for H PUB , ALE, IMR, EDU UNIV and EXPFUND ST , while the variation between Regions prevails in H PRIV , MALE and OLD75. 19 In principle, the flexible translog form should be used to approximate at best an arbitrary underlying function. However, due to the high multicollinearity among the regressors (which include interacted and squared terms) and the limited degrees of freedom, in past studies the translog specification often resulted in parameter estimates failing to satisfy some of the basic properties of production theory. Therefore, as remarked by Greene (2004, p. 968), a strictly orthodox interpretation of the relationship between the health outcomes and the inputs as perfectly conforming to a neoclassical production function is likely to be optimistic, and the use of looser approximations is then justified. which can be concisely rewritten as:
The residual term, e it , can be thought either 1) as pure random noise -like in a standard average function approach, not accounting for the presence of productive inefficiency in observed health spending -or 2) as a composed error term, resulting from the sum of idiosyncratic noise (v it ) and a nonnegative inefficiency term (u it ) -like in a frontier function approach, where actual health spending is allowed to exceed the optimal (minimum) requirement. According to the latter interpretation, a
Region that is managing more efficiently the provision of health care will, ceteris paribus, have a lower per capita expenditure, reflected in a lower value of u it . This allows us to interpret exp(u it ) = {H PUB it /exp[ f (lnY it , lnINPUT it , lnCV it ) + v it ]} as the percentage increase in health spending with respect to the stochastic 'best-practice' level, which is due to productive inefficiency. When u it = 0 for a particular Region i in year t, all inefficiencies are eliminated and the 'best-practice' input requirement frontier is attained. 20 Starting from these premises, we proceed with the estimation of three different version of the input requirement model [2]:
• an average health spending function, where our key variable EXPFUND ST appears as an explicative factor for the whole H PUB -without distinguishing the efficient (or structural) component from the inefficient one -thus, closely mirroring BT09. In this case, the residual is assumed to be a symmetric normally distributed random variable, e it ~ N(0,σ e 2 ), and the model is estimated by LSDV;
• two frontier health spending functions, in which e it = (v it + u it ), with v it ~ N(0,σ v 2 ) and u it ~ |N(μ,σ u 2 )|, to indicate that inefficiency term is modelled as the absolute 20 Notice that exp(u it ) takes values ranging between one (when u it = 0) and infinity (when u it → ∞).
value of a normally distributed random variable. 21 In order to test whether or not bailout expectations influences excess spending, we follow the standard Battese and Coelli (1995) specification and allow the mean of the inefficiency to depend on EXPFUND ST, by assuming that μ is free to vary both across RGs and over years according to the expression:
Moreover, to provide an answer to the key question of our study -i.e., whether bailout expectations affect only productive inefficiency or also the structural and γ ≡ σ u 2 /(σ v 2 + σ u 2 ). 22 The parameter γ must lie between 0 and 1 and provides useful information on the relative contribution of u it and v it to the global residual e it , hence on the importance of estimating a 'best-practice' frontier instead of an average input requirement function, by separating inefficiencies from structural spending. 23 It is important to highlight that adding the full set of regional dummies REG in the vector CV corresponds to implementing the 'true' fixed-effects ML frontier model proposed by Greene (2004 Greene ( , 2005a , which has the virtue to allow a distinction 21 This assumption means that u it arises from the truncation (at zero) of a normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ u 2 and can also be expressed as u it ~ N + (μ,σ u 2 ). On truncated normal distribution, see, e.g., Kumbhakar and Lowell (2000) , pp. 74-86. 22 The prediction of inefficiencies exp(u it ) depends on all the parameters of the model and exploits the Battese and Coelli (1995) estimator. See also Kumbhakar and Lowell (2000) , p. 78. 23 As γ → 0, the symmetric noise component dominates the one-sided inefficiency term in determining the variation of total residual e it , while the inverse occurs as γ → 1. Notice that, in the former case, we are back to a traditional average spending model with no stochastic inefficiency, whereas in the latter case we face a deterministic frontier spending model with no random noise. between the unobserved cross-region heterogeneity, unrelated to inefficiency, and the inefficiency itself. while it shows a certain degree of substitutability with private health spending and with higher education. The latter result can be explained by the fact that higher educated people do more prevention, demand more preventive care, using nonmedical inputs and leading healthier lifestyles, so as to become more efficient users of care and producers of health; thus, ceteris paribus, the effect of rising EDU UNIV is to reduce the aggregate costs for health care. 26 [ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 24 A possible criticism against the use of fixed effects in nonlinear models is the incidental parameters problem (Lancaster, 2000) , a persistent bias that typically arises in short panels. However, existing evidence in support of this view is all based on binary choice models, whereas Greene (2005a,b), relying on Monte Carlo simulation applied to stochastic frontier models, found that the biases in coefficient estimates are small and, more importantly, there appear to be only minor biases transmitted to inefficiency estimates. 25 Results obtained proxying health with ALE 45 and ALE 75 are not reported here for brevity and are available upon request from the authors. However, they are substantially close (also in terms of magnitudes) to those discussed in the text, both for the 'average' spending function and for the 'frontier' model.
The positive coefficient of TREND shows that RGs health spending increases at an annual rate of about 3-4%. To some extent, this growth over time of H PUB is due to changes in medical technology, implying better and more costly treatments. 27 As for the impact of demographic factors, the negative coefficient of MALE indicates that females are more likely to visit health providers than males 28 ; moreover, the positive effect of POP75 confirms that a rise in the share of the elderly out of total population tends to cause higher health costs, because of the increased incidence of chronic diseases, as well as the closer proximity to death. 29 Turning now the attention to the impact of bailout expectations on spending performance of RGs health care policies, EXPFUND ST coefficient has the expected positive sign and it is statistically significant and similar in magnitude using both output specifications: it suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase (decrease) in 'expected' CG funding brings about roughly a 0.65% increase (decrease) in public health spending used by RGs to guarantee a certain outcome in terms of average life expectancy or infant mortality. For instance, looking at sample means of 'expected' CG funding and RGs health spending, when EXPFUND ST diminishes from 798 to 718 € per capita, H PUB reduces from 1,360 to 1,351 € per capita. 30 Hence, relying on a different modeling approach (i.e., the input requirement function) and a longer time span, we find again the result emerged in BT09, which suggests that RGs react to expectations of a tighter CG in terms of funding with a tighter control on health care expenditure. What we do not know yet is whether this effort by the CG to harden the budget constraint of RGs affects the structural component of health spending -implying some real effects on citizens' well-being -or it simply reduces 27 A similar finding has been obtained in a recent study on Swiss health care system by Filippini et al. (2006) . In general, technical progress is considered an essential factor in rising health care costs (see Newhouse, 1992) . 28 In particular, Chernichovsky and Markowitz (2004) point to a remarkable increase in the number of visits to doctors and specialists by females between 25 and 64 year old, and in the number of visits to nurses by females between 25 and 44 year old. Looking first at the FULL MODEL specification -where EXPFUND ST is included both as a shifter of the frontier (lnH PUB ) and as a determinant of excess spending (u it ), the coefficients related to output, inputs, time trend and demographic variables are all statistically significant, using both output measures, and their magnitude is very close to the estimates obtained for the average input requirement function. As before, the significance of most regional dummies (eight/nine out of fourteen) confirms the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the data and the importance of including individual fixed-effects. The null hypotheses that spending inefficiency effects are absent (i.e., γ = δ 0 = δ 1 = 0, hence u it = 0) is tested using a generalized LR test, and it is rejected at the 1% significance level (5% if Y = IMR). 32 31 It is worth noting that the output indicators we adopt do not allow to control for the 'quality' of health outcomes. Therefore, an increase observed in public spending devoted to guarantee a given output level (ALE or IMR) can be associated to an improvement of citizens' well-being (e.g., by rising the quality of some relevant health services, with a real impact on the quality of life), as well as to a waste of resources (e.g., by providing inappropriate services, which clearly implies no real effects on well-being). However, data on DALE are not available for Italian regions. See footnote 14 above. 32 Notice that difficulties arise in testing hypotheses where γ is equal to 0, as γ = 0 lies on the boundary of the parameter space for γ, and it cannot take negative values. In all these cases, if the null hypothesis is true, the LR statistic has an asymptotic distribution which is a mixture of χ 2 distributions whose critical values are obtained from table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986).
We can also notice that the estimate for γ is 0.672 ( as we find no evidence to reject the RESTRICTED MODEL 33 , we are allowed to conclude that bailout expectations do not significantly affect the position of the 'best-practice' frontier (hence, they should not influence citizens' well-being), while they seem to have a remarkable impact on spending inefficiency. The following comments, which discuss more in depth inefficiency estimates and the role played by EXPFUND ST , rely then on the results from the restricted specification (table 7) . and average cost inefficiency is found to be 3% (2.5%). 35 for increasing levels of 'expected' CG funding. In particular, the yearly trend of average cost inefficiency (computed using both output indicators) and EXPFUND ST suggests that fiscal discipline by CG towards RGs was effective in containing wastes during the mid '90s, when more severe rules for accessing EMU were in force.
Starting from the end of the '90s, however, ex-ante CG funding -conditional to RGs expectations on p -began again to increase permanently, to some extent because of 34 Estimates of spending inefficiency for each RG in each year are reported in tables A1-A2 in the working paper version of this work. Notice that (average) regional inefficiencies are negatively related with the perceived quality of care services, thus confirming our claim of citizens' satisfaction as an indirect proof of wastes (Figure 1) . 35 The quite low values of spending inefficency may be due to a second potential issue concerning the use of the true fixed effects model, i.e., the possibility that the inefficiency terms are underestimated. Indeed, if there is some region-specific persistent inefficiency, it is absorbed by the regional dummy included in the frontier, which is also capturing any time invariant heterogeneity. Unfortunately, as remarked by Greene (2004, p. 964), there is no simple solution to this problem, since the blending of inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity is intrinsic to this modelling approach. 36 Given the total Italian population of 60,045,068 inhabitants in 2008, this average efficiency recovery on per capita health spending would amount to an aggregate saving of about 2.5 billions € (2 billions € if Y = IMR). the weaker external constraints imposed by the SGP; with this growth of 'expected' CG funding, also health spending inefficiency sharply augmented.
[INSERT FIGURES 2-6 HERE] Taken together, these findings are strongly in favour of the idea that lower bailout expectations, due to a more severe fiscal discipline by CG, have an influence only on regional excess spending, and have no real effects on citizens' well-being.
Therefore, enforcing fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments is expected to result in welfare improvements.
Concluding remarks
This paper investigates whether fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments, in order to harden their budget constraints, exerts any real effects on the well-being of the citizens or simply helps to reduce waste of public monies. We consider the provision of health care services by Italian Regions, a policy resulting from a complex net of intergovernmental relations and that can strongly influence citizens' welfare. We propose here to separate the efficient (or structural) component of regional health spending from the inefficient one (the excess spending), by estimating a frontier input requirement function. This modelling approach allows us to check whether bailout expectations -used as an indicator of the effort put forward by Central Government to induce fiscal discipline in sub-national Regional Governments -influence only spending inefficiencies or they have any real effects on citizens' health.
Our empirical analysis provides at least two interesting findings: first, there is evidence confirming that ex-ante Central Government funding is heavily affected by bailout expectations, and this suggests that Central Government can enforce fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments by fixing the level of funding. Second, and most importantly, controlling for other relevant inputs in the production of health (private health expenditure and education) and for environmental factors (demographic structure of the population, technological change, and region-specific individual effects), 'expected' funding (i.e., Central Government transfers conditional on expectations of deficit bailouts) influences only the inefficient component of Regional Governments spending. Fiscal discipline appears then effective in reducing wastes, without having any real effect on citizens' health, one of the main facets of individual well-being. Whether this matters also for other welfare sectors (e.g., social assistance, education), and other countries where these policies are decentralised towards sub-national governments as well, is an appealing issue for future research. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. LR test (u it = 0) 13.337*** 9.939** Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.*** 
